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The acceleration in U.S. total factor productivity after 1995:
The role of information technology
Introduction and summary
After the mid-1990s, labor and total factor productiv-
ity (TFP) accelerated in the United States. A growing
body of research has explored the robustness of the
U.S. acceleration, generally concluding that it reflects
an underlying technology acceleration. This research,
along with considerable anecdotal and microeconom-
ic evidence, suggests a substantial role for informa-
tion and communications technology (ICT).1
In this article, we briefly discuss the results of so-
called growth accounting at the aggregate level. We
then look more closely at the experience since the mid-
1990s, when TFP accelerated. We look at data on which
industries account for the TFP acceleration: Were the
1990s a time of rising total factor productivity growth
outside of the production of ICT? Our industry data
strongly support the view that a majority of the TFP
acceleration reflects an acceleration outside of the pro-
duction of ICT goods and software.2 Even when we
focus on arguably “well-measured” sectors (Griliches
1994; Nordhaus 2002), we find a substantial TFP ac-
celeration outside of ICT production.
In particular, wholesale and retail trade show a sub-
stantial acceleration in TFP after the mid-1990s. This
observation leads us, in the final part of the article, to
discuss anecdotal evidence on the kinds of changes that
have taken place in trade industries that might show
up in measured TFP. Retailers implemented numerous
organizational innovations, many of which required
substantial industry, firm, and establishment reorgani-
zation; many of these innovations themselves relied
centrally on innovations in ICT. Thus, ICT appears to
play a nuanced role in the post-1995 pickup in produc-
tivity growth. In particular, the benefits of ICT may
be subtle, affecting measured TFP in sectors that use
ICT, as firms reorganize production in order to take
advantage of the new technologies.
Before discussing numbers, why do we care about
TFP growth? First, TFP growth allows us to increase
the amount of output we produce—and, hence, how
much we have available to consume today or invest
for the future—without having to increase the resources
(mainly capital and labor) used. Equivalently, we can
produce the same output with fewer resources. This
efficiency gain is clearly good for society. Second,
economists generally argue that in the long run, TFP
growth is the only means of getting sustained in-
creases in standards of living, or output per worker.
The reason is that tangible capital is generally thought
to have a “diminishing marginal product.” In other
words, for a given number of workers, suppose we
increase the quantity of capital. It is reasonable to ex-
pect that the marginal contribution of that capital falls,
since we have to spread the same workers over more
machines and structures. As a result, investment in
equipment, software, and structures alone probably can-
not lead to sustained increases in standards of living—
as the marginal product of capital declines, the extra
capital leads to little or no extra output.
A complementary way to look at the benefits of
TFP growth is that one can show that TFP growth is
identically equal to a weighted average of real wages
and real payments to capital. If TFP growth rises, either
real wages or real payments to capital rise. Thus, if
we want to raise real wages without reducing returns
to capital, we need TFP growth.53 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Aggregate growth accounting results
If the economy’s output increases, then someone
must have produced it. In our empirical work, we think
of the economy as comprising a large number of firms
and industries. But to fix ideas, we start by assuming
that the economy has an aggregate production func-
tion that relates its overall real output Y to inputs of
capital K and labor L. Output also depends on the level
of technology, A. Output goes up if the economy’s
capital or labor input increases or if technology im-
proves. We write this function as:
1) Y = A × F(K,L).
The relationship in equation 1 is relatively intui-
tive. For example, the United States produces more
output than India each year, even though India has a
much larger labor force (and many more employed
workers) than the United States. Equation 1 suggests
that the United States either has more capital than
India or is more efficient at converting inputs into
output than India (that is, A is higher in the United
States), or (most likely) both.
More closely related to the focus of this article,
U.S. nonfarm business output increased more than
sixfold between 1948 and 2000; equation 1 says that
this reflects increases in capital, labor, or technology.
According to Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data,
over this same period, total labor input (adjusted for
changes in the composition of the labor force) in-
creased two and a half times, while capital input in-
creased about eightfold.
But what was the role of technological innova-
tions, represented by A? With a few assumptions about
the production function in equation 1, we can be more
precise about the role of technological innovations ver-
sus input increases in explaining output growth. We
discuss these assumptions further and derive the for-
mal equations in the appendix. Loosely speaking, the
key is that economic theory indicates how one can
account for the productive contribution of the inputs
of capital and labor. Any increase in output not ac-
counted for by increases in inputs is called total factor
productivity (also known as the Solow residual, after
Solow, 1957, or multifactor productivity).
The BLS produces a widely cited measure of TFP
growth, and the data that underlie its calculation, for
the U.S. economy. The BLS refers to this measure as
“multifactor productivity” or MFP; MFP, TFP, and
the Solow residual are three names for the same con-
cept—that is, output growth unexplained by growth
in inputs—and we use them interchangeably. As of
this writing, the data run through 2001. However, we
focus on the period through 2000, since 2001 was a
recession year and a large literature discusses the fact
that the Solow residual is procyclical (rising in booms
and falling in recessions).3 We wish to abstract from
that short-run focus here.
Several comments on the data are useful. In par-
ticular, there are, of course, many different types of
output and input. For real output, the BLS uses nation-
al accounting data from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA); (the BEA output indexes combine
the real value of the many different types of goods
and services produced). For labor, there are also many
different types of workers. These workers have dif-
ferent levels of productivity, reflecting factors such
as age, experience, and education. The BLS attempts
to control for these differences largely by using rela-
tive wage rates: If a college-educated worker earns a
higher wage than a high-school dropout, then we ex-
pect the main reason for this is that the college-edu-
cated worker is more productive. Similarly, capital
inputs combine a wide range of tangible goods, such
as office buildings, factories, machine presses, and
computers. For productivity calculations, one wants
a measure of the relative service flow from these dif-
ferent types of capital. The main issue is that a build-
ing may last 50 or more years, so it needs a low annual
service flow per dollar of capital to cover its costs; a
personal computer may last only three or so years, and
hence must have a high service flow per dollar of cap-
ital since it needs to cover its costs in a very short pe-
riod. The BLS produces a capital input measure that
takes into account the composition of the capital stock
across different types of capital. To do so, the BLS es-
timates the service flow of different types of capital.
Table 1 shows BLS data for the private non-farm
economy from 1948 to 2000. The first column shows
TFP growth, which was at an annual rate of about 1.2
percent between 1948 and 2000. This rate of increase,
compounded for 52 years, implies that the level of
TFP approximately doubled over this period.
The next three columns show the growth rates of
output and input quantities that underlie that TFP growth in
the BLS data. Output growth in the non-farm business
sector averaged about 3.7 percent per year; labor input
grew somewhat more slowly, about 1.8 percent per year;
while capital input grew somewhat more quickly, nearly
4.1 percent per year. The next column shows the average
share of labor compensation in total cost. Although it
fluctuates somewhat from year to year, this share aver-
aged 0.69 over the full sample period.54 1Q/2004, Economic Perspectives
The final two columns show that over time, labor
has benefited substantially from TFP growth, with
real wages rising 1.9 percent per year. Real rental rates,
by comparison, have been relatively flat—indeed, de-
clining slightly over time. This finding—that techno-
logical progress leads to an increase in real wages but
not an increase in real rental rates—is consistent with
standard theories of economic growth. When TFP in-
creases, the marginal products of labor and capital also
increase; initially, this leads to higher payments to these
factors as firms compete to hire (or, in the case of cap-
ital, rent) them. But in the case of capital, over time
the increased marginal product of capital leads to a sub-
stantial increase in investment and the quantity of cap-
ital, thereby driving the marginal product of capital
back down. (The increase in the capital stock, of course,
further raises the marginal product of labor, driving the
wage up further.) Hence, over time, TFP increases raise
the real wage as well as the real quantity of capital.
The remainder of the table summarizes important
changes over time in the evolution of these series.
Several facts are striking. First, comparing the 1948–
73 row with the 1973–95 row shows that TFP growth
and output growth slowed markedly after 1973. In terms
of factor payments, the slowdown in wage growth
was particularly marked. By contrast, there is little
evidence that factor quantity growth changed in any
particularly striking way.
Second, after 1995, TFP growth and output growth
surged. In the BLS data, although TFP growth did
not quite reach its pre-1973 levels, output growth ex-
ceeded its earlier rates. Input growth rates rose—with
a particularly notable pace of capital growth (nearly
5.4 percent per year). Real wage growth rose at a
pace only slightly below its pre-1973 growth rate of
nearly 2.8 percent; but real rental growth turned from
a slight negative to a sharp negative.
The post-1995 productivity acceleration is, of
course, of more than just historical interest, since many
aspects of future U.S. economic performance depend
on whether this fast pace of growth continues. For
example, faster productivity growth means faster growth
in income, which not only raises people’s standards
of living but also means that future tax receipts will
be higher, improving the government’s budget bal-
ance. An important, and still unresolved, issue is the
extent to which this productivity acceleration reflects
primarily information technology—the most notable
example of new technology in recent years.
Industry growth accounting results
The previous section looked at overall TFP
growth for the economy. A striking finding was the
pickup in TFP growth after 1995. In this section, we
ask the interesting follow-up question: Where did the
TFP growth take place in the economy? In particular,
was the pickup primarily centered in ICT producing
or ICT using industries?
When we disaggregate the data to an industry
level, an important conceptual question arises about
how to treat intermediate inputs (purchased goods
and services such as raw materials, parts, consultants,
advertising, and so forth) and, as a result, how to mea-
sure output. For example, suppose the economy pro-
duces bread. A farmer grows the wheat and sells it to
a miller; the miller produces flour and sells it to a baker;
and the baker bakes bread and sells it to a household.
At an economy-wide level, we do not want to mea-
sure total output by summing the value of the wheat
plus the value of the flour plus the value of the bread.
We just want to count the value of the final loaves of
bread. An alternative way to measure that final output
is by summing the so-called value added of the farmer,
the miller, and the baker—that is, the value of their
TABLE 1
Output, inputs, factor prices, and TFP—Nonfarm business sector
(average annual percent change)
Labor Capital Average Real wage Real rental
TFP Output input input labor share growth growth
1 2 3 4567
1948–2000 1.18 3.66 1.77 4.06 0.69 1.91 –0.45
1948–1973 1.90 4.10 1.45 3.91 0.69 2.79 –0.14
1973–1995 0.38 2.95 1.98 3.94 0.69 0.76 –0.50
1995–2000 1.13 4.54 2.46 5.37 0.67 2.55 –1.83
Note: Real labor compensation and rental rate of capital are deflated using the output deflator.
Source: Data obtained from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics website on Multifactor Productivity, at www.bls.gov/web/
prod3.supp.toc.htm.55 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
sales minus the value of the intermediate inputs they
purchased. At an economy-wide level, the inputs
used to produce the bread comprise the capital and
labor used by the farmer, the miller, and the baker.
We focus, for simplicity, on the value-added ap-
proach, even at the industry level. The advantage of
this approach is that these estimates are “scaled” to be
comparable across industries. The potential disadvan-
tage, of course, is that the measure of output—value
added—is rather less natural than the “gross output”
of shoes, bread, and so forth. In the words of Domar
(1961), value added is “shoes lacking leather, made
without power.” In our example, it is bread lacking
flour. Nevertheless, for standard measures of TFP,
the value-added measures are simply rescaled versions
of gross-output TFP (with a scaling factor that depends
on the ratio of nominal gross output to nominal value
added), so no important information is lost.4
We use a 51-industry dataset discussed in Basu,
Fernald, Oulton, and Srinivasan (2003). These data
update that used in Bosworth and Triplett (2002) and
Basu, Fernald, and Shapiro (2001). The industry value-
added measures (derived from industry gross output
and intermediate-input use) come from industry-level
national accounts data from the BEA. For capital in-
put—including detailed ICT data—we use BLS capi-
tal input data by disaggregated industry. For labor input,
we use unpublished BLS data on hours worked by
two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) in-
dustry. Real industry output data are not available be-
fore 1977 and, for some industries, not before 1987.5
Table 2 overleaf provides standard estimates of
TFP for various aggregates, including the one-digit
industry level. The first three columns show TFP in
value-added terms. The final column shows the sector’s
nominal value-added share.6
The top line shows the sizable acceleration in TFP
growth, from about 0.6 percent per year to about 1.9
percent.7 These calculations incorporate a labor com-
position adjustment from Aaronson and Sullivan (2001),
shown in the second line. Labor quality growth increased
more slowly in the second half of the 1990s, when the
booming economy drew lower skilled workers into em-
ployment. Hence, adjusting for improvements in la-
bor “quality” heightens the magnitude of the TFP
acceleration calculated with raw hours (shown in the
third line, calculated as the appropriate weighted average
of the industry TFP growth rates shown in the table).8
The remainder of the table shows various sub-ag-
gregates, including the one-digit SIC level (none of
which incorporate a labor quality adjustment). It is
clear that in our dataset, the acceleration was not limited
to the ICT-producing sectors. First, if we focus on the
non-ICT producing sectors (third line from bottom),
we see an acceleration of nearly 1 percentage point.
In an accounting sense, these sectors contribute about
0.9 percentage points of the 1.2 percentage point to-
tal (non-quality adjusted) acceleration. Major non-
ICT sectors contributing to the acceleration include
wholesale trade, retail trade, finance, and insurance.
Second, Griliches (1994) and Nordhaus (2002)
argue that real output in many service industries is
poorly measured—for example, it is often difficult
even conceptually to decide on the “real output” of a
bank or a lawyer. Nordhaus argues for focusing on
what one hopes are the “well-measured” (or at least,
better measured) sectors of the economy. The acceler-
ation in TFP in well-measured industries is even larger
than the overall acceleration; the acceleration is sizable
even when we exclude ICT-producing sectors.
Looking more closely at the sectoral data, the
trade sectors, especially retail, emerge as a major con-
tributor to the productivity acceleration. U.S. retail
value-added TFP growth rose by 4.5 percentage points
per year. Together, wholesale and retail trade “account”
for about three-quarters of the U.S. acceleration
(weighted by output shares). Nevertheless, they are
not the entire story. Even excluding these sectors, the
U.S. data still show an acceleration.9
That the U.S. productivity acceleration was broad-
based is consistent with a growing body of recent
work. For example, the Council of Economic Advisers
(2003) reports that between 1973–95 and 1995–2002,
non-ICT TFP accelerated sharply, with its contribu-
tion to U.S. growth rising from 0.18 percentage points
per year to 1.25 percentage points, roughly in line
with the figures here.10 Bosworth and Triplett (2002)
focus on the performance of service industries and
find a widespread acceleration. Jorgenson, Ho, and
Stiroh (2002) also find that TFP accelerated outside
ICT production, although by a smaller amount.11
Case study: Anecdotal evidence on
production and productivity in retail trade
In the preceding sections of the article, we docu-
mented the resurgence in TFP growth after 1995 in
both aggregate and industry data. We also document-
ed that the majority of the acceleration occurred in
sectors that use, rather than produce, information
technology. Within these IT-using sectors, we reported
that wholesale and retail trade appeared particularly
important in accounting for the TFP resurgence. We
now look more closely at these industries, seeking
anecdotal evidence on the kinds of changes that have
taken place in trade industries that might show up in56 1Q/2004, Economic Perspectives
measured TFP. This anecdotal evidence may provide
insights into the underlying sources of TFP growth.12
The Bureau of Economic Analysis—the source for
our data—defines retail trade as a distribution service
of goods to individuals.13 According to the BEA’s gross
domestic product-by-industry measure, total output
in retail trade is measured by retail sales, excluding
the value of the actual good sold and taxes collected
by individual retail stores. Thus, value added would
be these distribution services minus the contribution
of the electricity, utilities, cleaning services, and other
intermediate inputs.14
A difficult issue that national accountants have
to struggle with is how to measure real, or inflation-
adjusted, output. If there are no changes in the quali-
ty of goods sold, then simply recording the value of
sales and the prices charged makes it relatively easy
to measure real output. However, when there are sub-
stantial changes in quality—for example, retailers stock
a wider variety of products so you are more likely to
find what you want; or the Internet makes it easy to
buy goods at home if, in fact, you hate fighting crowds
at the mall—it becomes much more difficult to prop-
erly measure real output. For example, some people
have argued that the substantial use of information
TABLE 2
Total factor productivity growth by industry in private non-farm business, 1990–2000
(percent change, annual rate)
Productivity (value-added terms)b Share of nominal value added
pre-1995 post-1995 Acceleration 2000
Private non-farm economy
  (adjusted for labor quality)a 0.59 1.92 1.32 100.0
Contribution of labor quality 0.32 0.16
Private non-farm economy
  (not adjusted for labor quality) 0.91 2.08 1.17
Mining 3.08 –2.15 –5.23 1.6
Manufacturing 2.40 2.76 0.36 20.6
Nondurables 1.02 –1.20 –2.22 8.7
Durables 3.47 5.61 2.14 12.0
Construction 0.39 –0.98 –1.38 6.1
Transportation 1.69 1.53 –0.16 4.2
Communication 2.31 0.15 –2.16 3.7
Electric/gas/sanitary 0.42 0.17 –0.25 2.9
Wholesale trade 1.66 5.37 3.71 9.2
Retail trade 0.83 5.33 4.50 11.8
Finance & insurance 0.44 3.39 2.96 10.7
Finance 1.31 4.90 3.59 7.5
Insurance –1.49 –0.06 1.44 3.2
Business services & real estate 1.12 0.40 –0.72 13.9
Business services 0.60 –1.40 –2.00 7.1
Real estate 1.55 2.34 0.79 6.8
Other services –1.89 0.08 1.97 15.2
ICT producingc 5.52 11.02 5.50 5.3
Non ICT producing 0.61 1.54 0.93 94.7
Well-measured industriesd 1.80 3.17 1.37 54.2
Well-measured
  (excluding ICT producing) 1.35 2.24 0.88 48.9
aFor productivity purposes, our definition of private non-farm business excludes holding and other investment offices along with miscellaneous
services, since consistent input and output data are unavailable for these industries.
bValue-added TFP growth is defined as (gross output TFP growth)/(1 – share of intermediate inputs). Implicitly, this uses the Törnqvist index
of value added for a sector.
cICT-producing includes industrial machinery and electronic and other electrical equipment sectors.
dWell-measured industries include mining, manufacturing, transportation, communication, electric/gas/sanitary, and wholesale and retail trade.
Sources: Authors’ calculations based upon data from Bosworth and Triplett (2003), the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and the Bureau of Labor
Statistics.57 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
technology in retailing has made it increasingly diffi-
cult to measure real output accurately.
Nakamura discusses the difficulties in measuring
output that resulted from changes in the retail environ-
ment between 1978 and 1996. Retailers with advanced
technology offered lower prices and replaced retailers
with older technology whose goods sold for more.
Nakamura (1997) defines this “rapid automation of
retail transactions processing” as the “retail revolu-
tion.” According to Nakamura, the BLS methodology
measures this decline in price as a decline in output
with a stable price, and misleadingly captures efficien-
cy as inefficiency. He suggests that retail output was
understated due to an increase in the quality of service
provided to consumers. Nakamura cites a report in the
trade publication Progressive Grocer that the average
items per store grew from 7,800 in 1970 to 19,612 in
1994. He notes that “Americans no longer had to make
do with bright yellow mustard, canned peas, and gel-
atin desserts” (Nakamura, 1997), highlighting increased
American living standards reflecting a proliferation
in goods provided by retailers.
Leaving this measurement issue aside, what do
the BEA data show about the growth rates of real out-
put and real inputs of capital and labor? Real value-
added in retail trade averaged 5.4 percent from 1995
to 2000, almost doubling the average growth between
1978 and 1995 of 2.9 percent. From our original pro-
duction function, we see that increases in value add-
ed are explained by either increases in inputs (capital
and labor) or improvements in technology. According
to BLS data, both capital and labor inputs for retail
trade grew more slowly, not more quickly, in the latter
half of the 1990s. Capital input grew at 4.7 percent
between 1978 and 1995, but only 3.9 percent between
1995 and 2000. Labor hour growth slowed from 1.5
percent to 1.3 percent over these periods.
Since the faster pace of output growth does not
reflect faster growth in inputs, TFP growth must have
risen. To think about the sources of TFP growth, it is
useful to think a bit about how information technology
shows up in the retail sector. The direct effect of add-
ing, say, new high-tech scanners and computers is sim-
ply capital deepening: Each worker can produce more
output using the same level of effort. But this new in-
formation technology as such represents more capital
input, not higher TFP. For example, many large retail-
ers invested in barcode technology with scanning ca-
pabilities for identifying goods. Prices then entered
into registers automatically, leaving less room for mis-
takes and, consequently, speeding the entire checkout
process. As a result, output increased, given that the
number of purchases increased along with overall sales.
This capital-deepening raises labor productivity
(output per hour), even if it does not raise TFP. Studies
conducted by the BLS find that labor productivity ac-
celerated between 1987 and 1999, partially accounted
for by information technology investment (Sieling,
Friedman, and Dumas, 2001). These BLS findings
show capital deepening indeed existed in retail trade
and contributed to higher output.
So how could investments in information tech-
nology affect TFP? One reason is that when retailers
invested heavily in new information technology, addi-
tional organizational changes followed that also en-
hanced production. Small modifications of this nature
often appear in TFP measures, and therefore serve as
a useful tool for examining TFP growth. For example,
adding coiled wire extensions to barcode scanners made
it unnecessary for employees to lift heavy objects in
stores that sold large items. This wire is a relatively
cheap piece of capital; the innovation is really the idea
of adding it to the scanner, an idea that may have been
thought up and implemented by the retailer rather than
the scanner manufacturer. This innovation, in turn,
helped speed the checkout line; output increased, with
a minimal investment.
In the remainder of this section, we investigate
changes that took place in retail trade prior to the late
1990s in the hope of gaining further insight into the
industry’s exceptional TFP performance. However,
one challenge is that organizational changes are often
coupled with capital investments, making it difficult
sometimes to disentangle the role of the capital itself
(an increase in capital per worker) from the increase
in TFP that came because the organizational innova-
tion allowed retailers to increase output more than they
increased inputs. So we do not try to separate or quan-
tify the effects. Given that capital input grew more
slowly in the second half of the 1990s than the first,
while output grew more quickly, it is clear that the
organizational changes played a key role.
The organizational structure of individual retail
firms altered dramatically following the introduction
of information technology to the industry. Retailers
partnered with manufacturers in place of using whole-
sale trade as an intermediary. With electronic data in-
terchange systems (EDI), retailers linked to suppliers,
which allowed for instant data exchanges. In addi-
tion, both retailers and suppliers agreed in advance
on how suppliers should react to the sales data gathered.
Together, these new practices helped reduce imperfect
information. According to the Economic Report of
the President, “Even where firms in the supply chain
remain separate entities, the degree of cooperation may
come to resemble what might occur in a vertically58 1Q/2004, Economic Perspectives
integrated firm” (Council of Economic Advisers,
2001). Holmes (2000) illustrates this aspect of supply-
chain management using the partnership between re-
tailer Wal-Mart and manufacturer Proctor & Gamble
(see also Kumar, 1996). According to Lou Prichett,
vice president at Proctor & Gamble, “P&G could moni-
tor Wal-Mart’s sales and inventory data, and then use
that information to make its own production and ship-
ping plans with a great deal more efficiency” (Walton
and Huey, 1992). The Harvard Business Review finds
IT use in retailing helped reduce both human error
and shipment time, which then allowed retailers to
trim costs. Cutting costs grew in importance as more
discount stores entered the market. Changes also oc-
curred in how retailers organized inventory deliveries.
Holmes (2000) finds evidence that investment in IT
complemented both increases in inventory deliveries
and increases to store size. Retailers benefited from
economies of scale by filling trucks to capacity with
larger orders and, thus, stores grew in size. Holmes
also notes that “Wal-Mart and Home Depot led other
retailers in increasing the frequency of deliveries,”
citing Vance and Scott (1994), who claim that Wal-Mart’s
daily deliveries set them apart from rival Kmart, whose
deliveries came once every five days.
As modifications were taking place within indi-
vidual firms, the entire marketplace experienced a
transformation as well. A new larger design for stores
emerged—the “big-box” format—whereby retailers
took advantage of their size and offered a wide spec-
trum of goods at lower prices. Retail trade is typically
dominated by small businesses; thus, Foster, Haltiwanger,
and Krizan’s (2000) finding that large retailers dis-
placed smaller, less efficient retailers implies that the
entrance of large chain stores significantly affected
the industry. They find that this displacement increased
overall productivity in retail trade through entry and
exit of firms, with the entrance of efficient firms car-
rying a larger weight in the productivity boost. Anec-
dotal evidence shows that large retailers also displaced
other large retailers. Kmart surpassed Sears, Roebuck,
and Co. to dominate market share of the retail industry,
but later fell to Wal-Mart, which currently dominates.15
Using new systems under supply-side manage-
ment, retailers cut costs and offered “everyday low
prices,” yet remained profitable since sales increased
with lower-priced goods. Organizational changes tied
to the infiltration of information technology increased
efficiency and improved the overall production process.
These within-firm changes affected the entire indus-
try by displacing inefficient firms and promoting the
spread of effective production procedures. In fact,
studies by McKinsey Global Institute suggest retail
giant, Wal-Mart, had both an indirect and direct im-
pact on general merchandizing through “managerial
innovation that increased competitive intensity and
drove the diffusion of best practice” (McKinsey, 2001).
Below, we discuss operations initiated by Wal-Mart
to add a firm-level perspective to the productivity ac-
celeration in retail trade.
Wal-Mart: Examples of ideas put to work
“How did a peddler of cheap shirts and fishing
rods become the mightiest corporation in America?”—
Fortune magazine posed this question after Wal-Mart
topped its Fortune 500 list in 2002, making it the
first service sector corporation to reach the top. From
its small town start in Arkansas, Wal-Mart has grown
into an empire spanning the globe. In fact, Wal-Mart
accounted for 6 percent of total U.S. retail sales in the
fiscal year ending January 31, 2003.16
Wal-Mart differed from other retailers in many
of its strategies. Large retailers like Kmart and Sears,
Roebuck, and Company targeted urban populations,
believing that rural areas were not profitable. Wal-Mart,
on the other hand, contended that a market existed in
rural America as well. Though the advantage of build-
ing in urban areas came from proximity to distribu-
tors, Wal-Mart solved this problem by building capacity
to install an internal distribution system. Essentially,
Wal-Mart took on wholesaling in addition to the re-
tail business (McKinsey, 2001). As discussed earlier,
retailers cut costs and saved time by establishing di-
rect contact with manufacturers. Wal-Mart exploited
this new practice by establishing direct contact with
Proctor & Gamble, and then warehoused merchandise
in P&G’s distribution centers. By centrally placing
large orders, Wal-Mart was able to negotiate reduced
prices on goods from manufacturers, helping it later
to under-price competitors (McKinsey, 2001; Raff
and Temin, 1997).
Wal-Mart also benefited from shrewd managerial
tactics, beginning with company founder and CEO,
Sam Walton. According to McKinsey Global Institute,
managerial innovations “gave Wal-Mart a 44 percent
productivity gap relative to the remainder of the mar-
ket” (McKinsey, 2001). In Walton’s book, Made in
America, he discusses the importance of learning
from those who were more successful, which at the
time was Kmart. Wal-Mart was not an overnight suc-
cess—in fact, it spent many years on the sidelines
learning while retailers like Kmart dominated the in-
dustry. Walton asserts that “During this whole early
period, Wal-Mart was too small and insignificant for
any of the big boys to notice. … That helped me get
access to a lot of information about how they were59 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
doing things” (Walton and Huey, 1992). While Wal-Mart
remained small, Walton invested in intangible capital
by learning the most effective methods of operation.
Flying all over the country and noting different ways
to run a business, Walton accumulated a wide array
of business models to develop his own, using what
he believed to be the most successful practices. De-
scribed by Fortune magazine as “an admirer and
student of Kmart,” Walton was later named one of
Fortune’s Top 10 CEOs of All Time. During Wal-Mart’s
fledgling years, Walton spent time and money learn-
ing the trade from his competition. That investment
made in intangible capital (knowledge) can be con-
sidered similar to an investment in physical capital.
With some lag, Walton’s knowledge would eventually
pay off, adding to Wal-Mart’s output production by
way of efficiency. This heightened efficiency would
then contribute to TFP growth.
Wal-Mart is often cited as a leader in using in-
formation technology. Walton discusses how he chose
to adopt computerization. He discusses how Wal-Mart
maintained inventory through lists that they updated
manually. At that time other retailers were moving to-
ward computerization. Walton says “I made up my mind
I was going to learn something about IBM computers. So
I enrolled in a school for retailers in Poughkeepsie,
New York” (Walton and Huey, p. 107). Significantly,
Walton used this opportunity to recruit talented indi-
viduals to work for Wal-Mart. Additionally, Walton
recruited Wal-Mart’s team from other successful re-
tailers. Though this would seem to benefit Wal-Mart
at the expense of other retailers, the overall advantage
came from the increased competition for the entire
industry. Outside human capital accumulated by scout-
ing other companies for talented individuals who knew
the field and free riding off knowledge learned else-
where—this contribution of knowledge also appears
in TFP measures.
Insights from the case study
The preceding discussion of developments in the
trade sector, along with the quantitative evidence on
the TFP acceleration, suggests some admittedly spec-
ulative insights into the U.S. productivity acceleration.
In particular, as many people have noted, the acceler-
ation coincided with accelerated price declines for com-
puters and semiconductors; but, as we just saw, most
of the TFP acceleration appears to have taken place
outside of ICT production, such as in retail trade. How
are these two observations related?
First, as the retail discussion suggested, innovation
is a challenge for the measurement of real output. In-
formation technology makes it possible for retailers
to keep track of a much larger variety of goods and
to operate much larger stores. Consumers likely value
the greater variety of goods that they get access to;
this variety thus suggests that consumers get a higher
quality shopping experience. Correcting for this quali-
ty improvement suggests that we currently overstate
prices and understate real output, as Nakamura (1997,
1998) argues. But as Kay (2003) suggests, some con-
sumers may also be getting a less pleasurable shopping
experience—offsetting some of that higher quality
shopping experience.
It is worth mentioning, however, that innovation
and the ensuing difficulties in disentangling price from
quantity are not new. Although most people suspect
that information technology has made the measure-
ment problems worse, Triplett (1997) expresses skep-
ticism, noting that these difficulties existed in the past
as well. De Long (1998) argues that because of un-
measured improvements in the quality of goods and
services, real incomes per work hour plausibly rose
thirtyfold over the preceding century, compared with
the sixfold increase one would find if one simply
looked at the Historical Statistics of the United States.
DeLong’s discussion, in particular, highlights the vast
range of new products available late in the twentieth
century that were unavailable at any price in the late
nineteenth century (and, as he suggests, makes it dif-
ficult to capture changes in living standards in a single
number). For example, DeLong (2000) writes of the
shortcomings of life in the mid-nineteenth century as
follows:
I would want, first, health insurance:
the ability to go to the doctor and be treated
with late-twentieth-century medicines.
Franklin Delano Roosevelt was crippled
by polio. Without antibiotic and adrenaline
shots I would now be dead of childhood
pneumonia. The second thing I would want
would be utility hookups—electricity and gas,
central heating, and consumer appliances.
The third thing I want to buy is access to
information—audio and video broadcasts,
recorded music, computing power, and
access to databases. None of these were
available at any price back in 1860.
I could substitute other purchases for
some. I could not buy a washing machine,
but I could (and would) hire a live-in laun-
dress to do the household’s washing. I could
not buy airplane tickets; I could make sure
that when I did travel by long distance train
and boat I could do so first class, so that
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amounts of time it would be time spent rela-
tively pleasantly. But I could do nothing for
medical care. And I could do nothing for ac-
cess to information, communications, and
entertainment technology save to leave the
children home with the servants and go to
the opera and the theater every other week.
How much are the central heating, electric
lights, fluoridated toothpaste, electric toaster
ovens, clothes-washing machines, dish-
washers, synthetic fiber-blend clothes, radios,
intercontinental telephones, xerox machines,
notebook computers, automobiles, and
steel-framed skyscrapers that I have used so
far today worth—and it is only 10 A.M.?
Of the products DeLong lists, only notebook
computers are clearly associated with the late 1990s.
Second, in retailing, many innovations implement-
ed by retailers were accompanied by capital invest-
ment in computers or structures (for example, the big
box format). In essence, the innovation often required
reorganization at the level of the establishment, firm,
or industry—which requires tangible physical changes.
This can make it difficult to disentangle anecdotally
the role of TFP from the role of capital deepening. But
conceptually, innovations in computers per se should
not show up as faster technology change in retailing:
For a retailer, a new computer represents capital deep-
ening, and growth accountants take account of that.
(And, indeed, we found that in retailing, there was a
slower pace of capital deepening in the late 1990s than
in the 1977–95 period.)
Computer innovations would show up as retailing
TFP to the extent that computers have an abnormally
large return or to the extent that investments in com-
puters are correlated with other, unobserved innova-
tions by retailers. Indeed, many of the key innovations
took place in retailing per se, for example, organization-
al changes that were made possible by information
technology but nevertheless required substantial invest-
ments of time and resources by retailers to implement.
A growing literature on ICT as a “general purpose
technology” (GPT) suggests important—but often in-
direct and hard to foresee—potential ways for ICT to
affect measured production and productivity in sectors
using ICT.17 Conceptually, one can separate these poten-
tial links into two categories: purposeful co-invention,
which we interpret as the accumulation of “comple-
mentary capital,” which leads to mismeasurement of
true technology; and externalities of one sort or another.
For example, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2003) find that
in a sample of 527 large U.S. firms from 1987 to 1994,
the benefits of computers for output and productivity
rise over time. The full benefits do not appear to be
realized for at least five to seven years. They interpret
their results as suggesting the importance of combin-
ing computer investments with “large and time-con-
suming investments in complementary inputs, such
as organizational capital.”
Basu, Fernald, Oulton, and Srinivasan (2003)
suggest that these indirect effects that arise from gen-
eral purpose technologies such as ICT are akin to what
Einstein, in the context of particle physics, called
“spooky action at a distance”: Quantum physics pre-
dicts that in some circumstances, actions performed
on a particle in one location instantaneously influence
another particle that is arbitrarily far away. In terms
of the effects of ICT, an innovation in one sector, ICT,
often causes unexpected ripples of co-invention and
co-investment in other sectors, such as retail trade.
Many of the GPT stories (for example, Bresnahan
and Trajtenberg, 1995, or Helpman and Trajtenberg,
1998) fall into this “spooky action” camp. (Of course,
Einstein’s spooky action was instantaneous; the ef-
fects of GPTs are not.)
Basu, Fernald, Oulton, and Srinivasan (2003)
discuss the difficulties in measuring the “intangible
investment” that firms accumulate in the form of or-
ganizational knowledge. The resulting “organization-
al capital” is, to some extent, analogous to physical
capital in that companies accumulate it in a purpose-
ful way. Basu et al. interpret this complementary capi-
tal as an additional input into a standard neoclassical
production function; it differs from ordinary capital
and labor in that it is not directly observed but must,
somehow, be inferred.18 When resources (for example,
labor time and effort) are diverted from production to
investment in this stock of unobserved complementary
knowledge, measured output and TFP fall; over time,
the service flow from that unobserved stock of knowl-
edge raises measured output and TFP. This story is
reasonably consistent with the experience in retail
trade, where inputs grew more quickly in the pre-1995
period, while output grew more quickly in the post-
1995 period.
In addition, the GPT literature suggests the like-
lihood of sizeable externalities to ICT. For example,
successful new managerial ideas—such as those im-
plemented in retail trade—seem likely to diffuse to
other firms. Imitation is often easier and less costly
than the initial co-invention of, say, a new organiza-
tion change, because you learn by watching and ana-
lyzing the experimentation, the successes and,
importantly, the mistakes made by others.19
Third, the complementary innovations by ICT
users, and any spillovers, take time to show up. Sam61 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Walton, for example, benefited in the 1980s and 1990s
from knowledge he accumulated flying around the coun-
try visiting competing discount stores and attending IBM
conferences in the 1960s and 1970s. More formally,
Basu et al. (2003) find that industries that had high
growth rates of ICT capital in the 1980s or early
1990s tended to have faster TFP growth rates in the
late 1990s. Importantly, benefiting from ICT requires
substantial complementary investments in learning,
reorganization, and the like, so that the payoff in terms
of measured output may be long delayed.
Conclusion
In this article, we have argued that the accelera-
tion in TFP was relatively broad based, with much of
it occurring in industries that used, not merely in
industries that produced, information and communi-
cations technology. Thus, it appears that ICT users
themselves introduced a lot of innovations in the way
they did business.
Nevertheless, as the experience of retail trade sug-
gests, many of these innovations took advantage of
the opportunities opened up by developments in ICT.
We view the experience of retail trade as consistent
with stories of ICT as a general purpose technology.
GPT stories generally suggest a subtle, nuanced, but
potentially far-reaching role for ICT to affect the econ-
omy. In particular, ICT induces innovations by ICT-users
both in the methods or processes they use to produce
and in the products themselves, in ways that are often
hard to forecast.
Framework for traditional growth accounting
If the economy’s output increases, then someone must
have produced it. In our empirical work, we think of
the economy as comprising a large number of firms
and industries. But to fix ideas, we start by assuming
that the economy has an aggregate production function
that relates its overall real output Y to inputs of capi-
tal K and labor L. Output also depends on the level of
technology, A. Output goes up if the economy’s capi-
tal or labor input increases or if technology im-
proves. We write this function as:
A1) Y = A × F(K,L).
The relationship in equation A1 is relatively in-
tuitive. For example, the United States produces
more output than India each year, even though India
has a much larger labor force (and many more em-
ployed workers) than the United States. Equation A1
suggests that either the United States has more capi-
tal than India, or the United States is more efficient at
converting inputs into output (that is, A is higher in
the United States), or (most likely) both.
More closely related to the focus of this paper,
U.S. nonfarm business output increased more than
sixfold between 1948 and 2000; equation A1 says
that this reflects increases in capital, labor, or technology.
According to BLS data, over this same time period,
total labor input (adjusted for changes in the compo-
sition of the labor force) increased two and a half
times, while capital input increased about eightfold.
But what was the role of technological innova-
tions? With a few assumptions about the production
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function in equation A1, we can be more precise
about the role of technological innovations versus
input increases in explaining output growth. To begin,
we assume that the production function has constant
returns to scale in inputs. This assumption implies
that if we change all inputs by a given factor, then
output changes by the same proportion; for example,
if we increase capital and labor inputs by 10 percent
each, then output also rises by 10 percent.
In the U.S. example, of course, inputs did not in-
crease proportionately—capital input grew much
faster. So how much should we weight each factor?
Suppose labor input, say, rises by a small amount dL,
while nothing else changes. The resulting increase in
output, which we denote dY, is approximately equal
to the following:
dY = MPL × dL.
MPL is the marginal product of labor, that is, it tells us
how much extra output one gets from a little bit more
labor input. (In calculus terms, MPL ≡ ∂Y/∂L.) By di-
viding through by Y and rearranging, one finds:
.
dY MPL L dL
YY L
×    =     
The left-hand side, dY/Y, is the percent change in out-
put—that is, the actual change dY divided by the lev-
el Y. Similarly, dL/L is the percent change in labor
input. In words, if labor input rises by, say, 10 percent
((dL/L) = 10 percent), then output growth equals an
elasticity [MPL × L/Y] times 10 percent.62 1Q/2004, Economic Perspectives
With some further assumptions about how firms
behave, we can gain further insight into this output
elasticity. Suppose a firm operates in a competitive
market (so it takes its output price as given) and hires
one additional worker. The benefit is that the firm
gets MPL more units of output, which it sells at price
P; the cost equals the wage, W. If the firm seeks to
maximize profits, it will hire workers as long as the
additional revenue it earns exceeds the wage it must
pay. The firm stops hiring when the benefits and
costs are just equal at the margin:
P × MPL = W.








Hence, the output elasticity is equal to labor’s share
in output, sL, which in turn equals payments to labor,
WL, as a share of the total value of output, PY.
Similarly, suppose R represents the rental cost of
capital to a firm; if the firm owns the capital, then
this rental cost is the implicit “user cost” or opportu-
nity cost of the capital to the firm. Following the
same logic as with labor, the elasticity of output with







In practice, wages are generally easier to observe
directly than is this rental value, since firms often
own the capital and do not make an explicit, observ-
able payment. But suppose we are willing to assume
that firms earn zero economic profits. Then, by defi-
nition, the value of output equals the cost of produc-
tion; the cost of production, in turn, equals the value
of payments to capital and labor. That is,
A2) PY = WL+ RK.
If we take equation A2 as an accounting identity,
then we can take capital’s share of output as a residual:
RK/PY = 1 – WL/PY
→ sK = 1 – sL.
We can now return to the question of how output
growth is related to input growth and technological
improvement. Following the same argument we
made earlier, we can again differentiate equation A1,
this time allowing all inputs as well as technology to
change, we find:
A3) (1 ) . LL
dY dK dL dA
ss
YK L A
   =− + +   
  
This equation shows that for output to grow, either
inputs must increase, or technology must improve.
This equation also allows us to “account” for growth,
by attributing output growth to increases in particular
factors or else to technology. In practice, we observe
(or can estimate) output growth and growth in capital
and labor; we observe labor’s share in output. Although
we don’t observe technology directly, we can estimate
it as a residual:
() A4) 1 . LL
dA dY dK dL
ss
AY K L
   =− − −   
  
Suppose inputs don’t change. Then output only
changes if this so-called “total factor productivity”
(TFP) residual, or Solow residual, changes.1 Although
we think of it as a broad measure of the economy’s
technological possibilities, it will capture all sorts of
things. These include pure technological innovations
(for example, faster computers); managerial innova-
tions such as workplace reorganization that allows the
firm to produce more output from a given quantity of
inputs; “cost reductions” that allow a firm to produce
the same quantity of output using less input; and any
spillovers of knowledge from other firms, for example,
on how best to benefit from information technology.
Why do we care about TFP growth? First, TFP
growth allows us to increase the amount of output we
produce—and hence, how much we have available to
consume today or invest for the future—without hav-
ing to increase the amount we use of any input. This
is clearly good for society. Second, economists gen-
erally argue that in the long run, TFP growth is the
only means of getting sustained increases in stan-
dards of living, or output per worker. The reason is
that capital is generally thought to have a “diminish-
ing marginal product.” In other words, for a given
number of workers, suppose we increase the quantity
of capital. It is reasonable to expect that the marginal
contribution of that capital falls, since we have to
spread the same workers over more machines and63 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
1This derivation follows Solow (1957). Hence, dA/A is often referred to as the Solow residual. In addition to TFP or the Solow residual,
this measure is sometimes referred to as multifactor productivity.
2To show this, consider the accounting identity in equation A2 again, but think of it as applying at an economy-wide level rather than a
firm-level; this is just the national accounts identity, which tells us that total income equals total output. Taking the total differential—
allowing all prices and quantities to change—yields:
PdY + YdP = [WdL + LdW] + [RdK + KdR].
With considerable rearrangement, one finds that TFP growth equals a weighted average of real factor prices:
() 1( 1 ) . LL L L
dY dK dL dW dP dR dP
ss s s
YK L W PR P
      −− − = − +− −          
structures. As a result, investment alone cannot lead
to sustained increases in standards of living—as the
marginal product of capital declines, the extra capital
leads to little or no extra output.
A complementary way to look at this question
on standards of living is that one can show that TFP
growth is identically equal to a weighted average of
real factor prices, W/P and R/P. Thus, if TFP growth
rises, either real wages or real payments to capital
rise. Thus, if we want to raise real wages without re-
ducing returns to capital, we need TFP growth.2
NOTES
1See Jorgenson (2001) or Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2002) for re-
views of the empirical literature on the productivity acceleration
and the role of information technology. We discuss this literature
in greater detail later.
2In our view, more studies than not find a widespread acceleration
in technology, for example, Basu, Fernald, and Shapiro (2001),
Baily and Lawrence (2001), Bosworth and Triplett (2002), Coun-
cil of Economic Advisers (2003), Jorgenson, Stiroh, and Ho (2002),
Nordhaus (2002), Oliner and Sichel (2000), and Stiroh (2002a,
2002b). Gordon (2003) remains a skeptic.
3See, for example, Basu and Fernald (2001).
4The productivity literature (for example, Jorgenson, Gollop, and
Fraumeni, 1987) tends to prefer to use gross-output residuals, with
explicit accounting for intermediate inputs. This literature then
uses “Domar weights” (the ratio of industry gross output to aggre-
gate value added) to get aggregate residuals. Apart from approxi-
mation error, this is equivalent to estimating industry value-added
residuals and then using value-added weights. Thus, our approach
of focusing on value added is conceptually equivalent to the stan-
dard gross-output approach. If the assumptions of constant returns
and perfect competition do not hold, however, then not only does
TFP not properly measure technology, but for econometric analy-
sis the use of value added versus gross output may make a differ-
ence; for a discussion of this point, see Basu and Fernald (1995, 2001).
5We thank Jack Triplett for sending us their industry dataset that
merged the BEA and BLS data. Basu, Fernald, Oulton, and Srinivasan
(2003) updated the BEA data to incorporate November 2002 NIPA
industry revisions and also to remove owner-occupied housing.
The BEA labor compensation data do not include proprietors or
the self-employed, so we follow Bosworth and Triplett in using
BLS data that correct for this. We thank Larry Rosenblum at the
BLS for sending us unpublished industry hours data, which make
adjustments for estimated hours worked by non-production and
supervisory employees as well as the self-employed. We updated
the BLS capital data from www.bls.gov/web/prod3.supp.toc.htm
(downloaded December 2002). We follow Bosworth and Triplett
and exclude several service sectors where consistent input or out-
put data are unavailable: holding and other investment offices, so-
cial services, membership organizations, and other services. The
dataset, along with further details on its construction, is available
on request.
6With Törnqvist aggregation, aggregate TFP growth is a weighted
average of industry gross-output TFP growth, where the so-called
Domar weights equal nominal industry gross output divided by
aggregate value added; the weights thus sum to more than one. In
continuous time, this is equivalent to first converting gross-output
residuals to value-added terms by dividing by one minus the in-
termediate share and then using shares in nominal value added. (In
discrete time, using average shares from adjacent periods, they
are approximately equivalent.) Basu and Fernald (2001) discuss
this aggregation and its extension to the case of imperfect compe-
tition; see also Oulton (2001).
7As noted earlier, the acceleration exceeds that in product-side
BLS data shown in table 1.
8The BEA industry data come from the income-side of the national
accounts, which, as is well known, accelerated faster than the ex-
penditure side in the late 1990s. See Bosworth and Triplett (2002)
for an extensive discussion of the difference between TFP growth
calculated with industry data and with the aggregate BLS data.
9We would note that Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2002), who use
output data from the BLS Office of Employment Projections, do
not find as important a contribution from the trade sectors.
10The CEA methodology is very similar to that of Oliner and Sichel
(2002), who report no TFP acceleration outside of ICT production.
But Oliner and Sichel discount their finding on this score, since their
method takes non-ICT TFP as a residual. Since the Oliner-Sichel
end-point is a recession year, 2001, they point out that any cycli-
cal effects on productivity are forced to show up in non-ICT TFP.
In addition, the CEA measure of labor productivity is a geometric
average of income- and product-side measures of output per hour.64 1Q/2004, Economic Perspectives
11Some recent research has looked at whether the results cited here
are robust to deviations from the usual growth-accounting assump-
tions that all industries have constant returns to scale and operate
under perfect competition; that firms can quickly and costlessly
adjust their levels of inputs; and that we observe all variations in
input use—that is, there is no unobserved utilization margin. In terms
of variable utilization, Basu, Fernald, and Shapiro (2001), Coun-
cil of Economic Advisers (various years), and Baily and Lawrence
(2001) all argue that variations in utilization, that is, cyclical
mismeasurement of inputs, play little if any role in the U.S. ac-
celeration of the late 1990s. Basu, Fernald, and Shapiro also find
little role in the productivity acceleration for deviations from con-
stant returns and perfect competition. Basu, Fernald, and Shapiro
do find a noticeable role for traditional adjustment costs associated
with investment. Because investment rose sharply in the late 1990s,
firms were, presumably, diverting an increasing amount of worker
time to installing the new capital rather than producing marketable
output. In other words, if there are costs of adjusting the capital
stock and faster growth leads to higher costs, then true techno-
logical progress was faster than measured. These considerations
strengthen the conclusion that the technology acceleration was
broad-based, since service and trade industries invested heavily
in the late 1990s and, hence, paid a lot of investment adjustment
12McKinsey (2001) provides anecdotal as well as quantitative
evidence on the transformation of wholesale and retail trade; Fos-
ter, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2002) link the retail industry data to
firm-level developments.
13BEA definition can be found in Industry Input-Output Methodologies
at www.bea.gov/bea/mp.htm.
14Sieling, Friedman, and Dumas (2001) and Foster, Haltiwanger,
and Krizan (2000) focus on detailed establishment-level data us-
ing Census Bureau data on retail sales as their measure of (gross)
output. Hence, one needs to keep in mind that some studies use a
different definition of output. Nevertheless, although the Census
Bureau and BEA measures differ, they nevertheless share identi-
cal definitions of value-added output.
15Robert Gordon (2003) discusses the importance of the “big box”
format that retailers like Wal-Mart follow. He argues Europe has
yet to reap the benefits of scale economies in retailing due to strict
regulations against large stores, which may help to explain the
productivity gap between Europe and the U.S. On the other hand,
John Kay (2003) cautions that it is difficult to control for changes
in quality—many small markets in Europe, while they may not
stock as many products as Wal-Mart, are in many cases a tourist
attraction because of the charm and pleasure associated with
visiting them.
16Wal-Mart’s market share was calculated as Wal-Mart’s reported
total net sales for 2002 over total U.S. retail sales in that year.
17See, for example, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000) and Bresnahan
(2001) for a discussion of the kinds of complementary investments
and co-invention that firms undertake in order to benefit from
ICT, given its “general purpose” attributes. David and Wright (1999)
provide a nice historical reflection on general purpose technologies.
18Much of Brynjolfsson’s work tries to quantify the role of unob-
served complementary capital. Macroeconomic studies of the ef-
fects of organizational capital include Greenwood and Yorokoglu
(1997), Hornstein and Krusell (1996), Hall (2001), and Laitner
and Stolyarov (2003).
19Bresnahan (2001) provides a nice discussion of the channels for
externalities to operate. Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) highlight
both “vertical” externalities (between general purpose technology
producers and each application sector) and “horizontal” externali-
ties (across application sectors).65 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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